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This book, a collection of related papers by the late John Clayton, who taught Philosophy 
of Religion at Lancaster University and then at Boston University, represents a valuable 
approach to the emerging field of cross-cultural philosophy of religion. Clayton provides a 
series of case studies in the history of theistic proofs: he attends to their place in Anselm, in 
Thomas Jefferson, in insightful and original comparisons of Udayana and al-Ghazali, and of 
Hume and Ramanuja, and then one chapter each on theistic proofs in early modern France, 
England, and Germany. Though not ground-breaking, these careful and elegantly written 
accounts have an agenda. They seek to trace the emergence and the limits of what Clayton 
refers to as the Enlightenment Project, that is, “the attempt to identify and to justify without 
recourse to outside authority or private passion but by the exercise of reason and the limits of 
experience alone” (p. 21). Clayton maintains that because the Enlightenment Project involves 
the attempt to find a nonperspectival perspective, it ends in irony and paradox. He therefore 
proposes that philosophy of religion reorient itself away from the “pretension” of grounding 
or undermining religious claims and toward the “more modest” aim of clarifying differences 
between religious claims (p. 41). 
 
The most original and important product of Clayton’s case studies concerns the distinctly 
religious uses of philosophical arguments. Clayton begins by pointing out that the various 
proofs of the existence of God have been employed in different kinds of contexts. They have 
been made and contested within a religious tradition (call this the intra-traditional context), 
between religious traditions (an inter-traditional context), and between a religious tradition 
and its secular critics (an extra-traditional context). When philosophers of religion treat theistic 
arguments as if they are meant to persuade those outside one’s religious tradition, they 
focus on either the inter- or the extra-traditional contexts, and they focus on the justificatory 
use of such arguments. But Clayton turns attention to the intra-traditional uses. He finds that 
religious arguments have been used for a wide range of purposes in addition to justifying 
religious beliefs to those who do not already share them. For example, theistic arguments 
have been used for polemical purposes, that is, to correct defective or deviant beliefs about the 
nature of God. They have also been used for hermeneutic purposes, to assist with the proper 
reading of sacred texts; and for edificatory purposes, to build up the community, its sense of 
well-being and its solidarity. Theistic proofs have thus been employed not only to convince 
the outsider but also to “correct the heretic, give courage to the waverer, edify the faithful, 
guide the interpretation of texts, express awe and wonder” (p. 299). All of these internally directed 
purposes Clayton illustrates with detailed examples from both the East and West. 
Philosophers of religion have rarely talked about proofs with this degree of appreciation for 
their contribution to the religious life. 
 
The editors of this book suggest that the method at work in Clayton’s studies is genealogical 
(pp. xv, 100). They are right that, like Michel Foucault, Clayton does not assume that all 
the criteria of rationality are universal; instead, both investigate what might be called local 
rationalities. Also like Foucault, Clayton’s approach is non-teleological: his histories of the 
religious use of argument do not look back on events from a perspective of what they should 
or will lead to. They contextualize. But Foucault’s goal for his genealogical method was to 
write a history that dispenses with subjects (Power/Knowledge [New York, 1980], 117) and 
that is far from Clayton’s approach. Clayton does attend to institutional contexts—to a minimal 
extent—but his goal is not to get at the micropractices that would give rise, for example, 
to the ontological argument as an effect, but rather to get at (to use one of his chapter titles) 
“the otherness of Anselm.” If Clayton’s method needs any label, it is not so much Foucaultean 
as it is Wittgensteinian. Clayton indexes rationality to practices and practices to cultural 
institutions not to eliminate the subject but rather (à la Peter Winch) to identify the point of 
the activity in the eyes of the subjects involved. This is why Clayton uses the term “forms of 
life” throughout the book. On this approach, the context of a claim is itself part of the claim’s 
analysis (p. 305) and philosophy seeks to provide a comparative grammar of religions. But 
Clayton’s Wittgensteinianism, thankfully, does not balkanize different religious traditions 
by immunizing them from external critique. It therefore leaves the door open for those who 
wish to pursue philosophy of religion’s evaluative task. 
 
In the end, Clayton does not deny but merely sets aside the fact that religious traditions 
have used theistic proofs to justify their beliefs. He is clear that he does not rule out external 
critique of religious claims. But given his internal focus, he says little about what that critical 
project will look like once one accepts the idea of rationalities in the plural. Nevertheless, 
Clayton’s essays illustrate one way in which attention to context might be integrated into the 
philosophy of religion, and how such attention can reveal the rich but overlooked uses of 
theistic arguments. 
